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The short run effect of the financial intermediary development on economic growth is ana-
lyzed using an unbalanced panel of 77 countries covering 35 years. Empirical Likelihood
(EL) estimation is used and compared to more conventional GMM methods that weight
moment conditions equally over the sample. However, if a part of the data is associated
with only weak instruments, GMM estimators are subject to considerable small sample
bias. EL appropriately re-weights the moment restrictions to deal with that problem. Using
EL, we obtain more robust estimates of the effect of financial intermediation on economic
growth than GMM.
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1 Introduction
The question of causality between financial structure and economic growth has been a topic of
research for a long time. Shumpeter (1912) emphasizes the role of financial intermediaries by
defining the banker as, not only a middleman, but also an authority who facilitates the chan-
nels for technological innovation. According to this view, a well functioning financial system
induces economic growth by evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and fa-
cilitating transactions. These services allow the reallocation of capital to its highest value use by
avoiding issues of moral hazard and adverse selection as well as minimizing transaction costs.
Many development economists, however, have ignored the role of the financial intermedi-
aries as a catalyst for economic growth. According to Robinson (1952), financial instruments
evolve as a response to the needs created by economic development. As such, financial devel-
opment should be seen as an outcome of economic growth not the cause of it. More recently,
Lucas (1988) argues that the finance-growth nexus is ”badly over-stressed”.
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An expanding recent empirical literature aims to shed some light on the above controversy,
see Levine (2004) for an excellent survey. King and Levine (1993) employ a cross sectional
data from 77 countries to regress three growth indicators on several measures of financial depth
while controlling for other factors affecting economic growth. They show that, ignoring causal-
ity, financial intermediary development positively affects economic activity and hence leads
long-run growth. Levine and Zervos (1998) report results from examining the relationship of
stock market liquidity and banking development on growth, capital accumulation and produc-
tivity improvements. They find that the former variables positively predict the latter, even after
controlling for economic and political factors. Moreover, La Porta et al (2000) and Andrianova,
Demetriades and Shortland (2008), show that higher degree of public ownerships of banks,
hence lower quality of the financial services, are associated with slower economic growth.
Most recent research uses panel data to cope with endogeneity, omitted variable bias and
collinearity which plagues the cross sectional models mentioned above. Levine, Loayza and
Beck (2000, hereafter LLB) use two Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators to a
macro panel of 74 countries during the 1960-95 period to show that the exogenous component
of financial development induces long-run economic growth.
The current paper analyses the effect of exogenous financial intermediary development on
economic growth using a dynamic panel data model. Specifications such as the long run model
in LLB have been used to model movements from one steady state to another, and also to
model the transition effects of various policies, such as financial liberalization. But if we expect
diffusion to have a differential impact on growth in the short-run than in the long-run, then
we may expect the long run model to be miss-specified. The use of a dynamic model has the
advantage that it allows financial development measures to have both a short-run and a long-run
impact on growth, which may be expected if full diffusion does not occur immediately.
Dynamic panel data model estimation is often conducted using GMM methods, see Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), where the lags of the regressors are used as
instruments. The main problem with these methods is that GMM estimation weights moment
conditions equally over the sample. However, if a part of the data is associated with only weak
instruments, GMM estimators are subject to considerable small sample bias and moreover, sim-
ulation studies have shown that test statistics based on GMM estimation can be heavily distorted
due to the downward bias of asymptotic standard errors, see Imbens, Spady and Johnson (1998).
In this paper we will employ Empirical Likelihood (hereafter EL) estimation as an alternative
to GMM to cope with these problems. EL, see Owen (1988, 1990, 1991), Qin and Lawless
(1994) and Imbens, Spady and Johnson (1998) for a few standard references, offers a theo-
retical improvement over GMM especially when the moment conditions are weakly defined.
In that case EL appropriately re-weights the moment restrictions. The literature on empirical
likelihood suggests that EL shares the same first order asymptotic efficiency as GMM while
having certain advantages related to higher order asymptotics, see Newey and Smith (2004).
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Recent simulation studies have shown that EL based estimation can also have attractive finite
sample properties, see Mittelhammer, Judge and Schoenberg (2001) on structural equations,
Brown and Newey (2001) and Bond and Windmeijer (2002) on dynamic panel data. Using EL
in the context of a dynamic model allows us to obtain more robust estimates of the relationship
between financial intermediation and economic growth than those obtained in the recent em-
pirical literature based on conventional GMM, see LLB. The latter display a lot of variability
between different model formulations that appear equally well specified according to tests for
over-identifying restrictions, whereas this is not the case for EL.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent empirical work on the rela-
tionship between growth and financial intermediation, section 3 discusses the short run model of
LLB, their data and the variables used in their study and ours, section 4 introduces the dynamic
model and it describes the GMM and EL estimators and section 5 compares their performance
in the context of a small Monte Carlo simulation study. Section 6 presents the empirical results
and finally we conclude.
2 Recent Empirical Work
As the search for better theoretical models progressed, so did the search for stronger empiri-
cal evidence of the relationship between financial development and growth. King and Levine
(1993) investigate whether higher levels of financial development are significantly and robustly
correlated with faster current and future rates of economic growth, physical capital accumula-
tion, and economic efficiency improvements. They use four measures of financial development:
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the importance of deposit banks relative to the central bank
in allocating domestic credit, issued to non-financial private firms divided by total credit, and
credit issued to non-financial private firms divided by GDP. The data spans 80 countries over
the period 1960 to 1989 and is taken from Levine and Renelt (1992). King and Levine (1993)
present two sets of findings. First, they study the strength of the partial correlation of the period-
average levels of the financial development indicators with the average rate of GDP growth, the
rate of physical capital accumulation, and the rate of improvement in economic efficiency over
the period. Second, they report results of the relationship between the initial level of the fi-
nancial development indicators and the average level of the aforementioned growth indicators.
In both sets of regressions they use period averages (i.e., one data point for each country) and
they construct pooled data where the data is constructed according to decades (i.e., three data
points for each country). The first series of regressions, studying the contemporaneous asso-
ciations, is performed using ordinary least squares. They report that higher levels of financial
development are positively associated with faster rates of economic growth, physical capital
accumulation, and economic efficiency improvements. Similarly, the second set of regressions
is also performed using ordinary least squares and they find that the predetermined component
of financial development is a good predictor of future growth over the next 10-30 years, future
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rates of capital accumulation, and improvements in economic efficiency. This work does not,
however, confront the potential biases caused by simultaneity or omitted variables, including
country-specific effects, as pointed out by LLB. For a study examining the robustness of these
estimates, see McCaig and Stengos (2005).
Levine and Zervos (1998) report results from examining the relationship of stock mar-
ket liquidity and banking development on growth, capital accumulation and productivity im-
provements. They find that the former variables positively predict the latter, even after con-
trolling for economic and political factors. Furthermore, both financial development indicators
enter significantly when used in the same regression. They also find that stock market size,
volatility, and international integration are not robustly linked with economic growth. Similar
to King and Levine (1993), the investigation uses both period averages and initial period values.
Thus, the strong association is not simply due to contemporaneous shocks to both the financial
sector and growth. This study does not, however, present any evidence on causality.
In an effort to extract the exogenous component of financial development, and hence
introduce results concerning causality, Levine (1998) examines the relationship between the
legal system and banking development. He then follows this connection through to long-run
rates of per capita GDP growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. The results in-
dicate that countries where the legal system emphasizes creditor rights and rigorously enforces
contracts have better-developed banks as compared to countries whose legal systems do not.
Further results indicate that the exogenous component of banking development – legal origins –
is positively and robustly associated with the growth indicators mentioned above. The analysis
uses cross-country differences in legal origin, creditor rights, and contract enforcement to iden-
tify the exogenous component of banking development. Tests of overidentifying restrictions do
not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, provid-
ing support for the proposition that the legal origin dummy variables are valid instruments for
the financial development indicators. As Levine (1998) notes, using the exogenous component
of financial development is a step forward in determining causality, but a dynamic panel setting
would be better as it would include the time series dimension.
In a subsequent paper, Levine (1999) presents results using legal and regulatory deter-
minants of financial intermediaries, such as creditor rights indicators, contract enforcement, the
risk of governments modifying contracts, and accounting standards, as instrumental variables
for various measures of financial development. Results via GMM reveal that the exogenous
component of financial development positively influences economic growth and tests of overi-
dentifying restrictions indicate that the data do not reject the hypothesis that the instrumental
variables are uncorrelated with the error term. Levine (1999) suggests that the data is consis-
tent with the view that improvements in creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting
standards further financial development, thereby accelerating growth. In addition, the results
are also consistent with the argument that causality runs in both directions; the results do not
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show that financial development occurs independently of growth, rather that the strong positive
association is not due only to simultaneity bias.
LLB extend the previous findings by including private savings rates as a growth indicator
by using a dynamic GMM panel estimator, in addition to a pure cross-country instrumental
variables estimator. For the dynamic GMM panel estimator, data is averaged over seven 5-year
periods. This technique helps to control for biases introduced either by simultaneity or unob-
served country-specific effects. The pure instrumental variables estimation technique is plagued
by shortcomings, since it does not exploit the time-series dimension of the data. Hence, esti-
mates from a cross-sectional specification may be biased due to omitted country-specific effects,
and it does not control properly for the endogeneity of all of the regressors. By comparison,
dynamic GMM panel estimation exploits the time series variation in the data, accounts for
unobserved country-specific effects, allows for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as
regressors, and controls for endogeneity of all regressors. They find that the level of financial
intermediary development exerts a large and positive impact on total factor productivity, which
feeds through to overall GDP growth.
All the results that have been discussed so far are based on linear specifications. There
has been some evidence in the recent growth literature that there may be nonlinear effects that
govern the growth process, especially when it comes to convergence and human capital effects,
see Kalaitzidakis et al (2001). Using semiparametric techniques, Ketteni et al (2007) have
shown that in the context of a finance growth model similar to the one that we are examining in
this paper, the effect of financial intermediation on growth appears to be linear. In our study, we
also use a dynamic a linear panel data model as the framework of our analysis.
3 The Data and the Variables
We use the data set used by LLB, where data for 74 countries is collected over the period of
1960-95. The observations for each country is averaged over non-overlapping 5 years periods.
As in LLB, the model for the logarithmic change in GDP for the country i at the time period
t can be represented as follows
∆yit = βFINANCEit + δCONDIT IONit + uit (1)
where FINANCE is one of the three financial development measures. These variables are
Liquid-Liabilities, Commercial-Central Bank and Private Credit. Liquid-Liabilities (LLY) is
defined as the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of the banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. Commercial-
Central Bank (BCOM) equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by the commercial
bank plus central bank assets. Private Credit (PRIVO) is the value of credits by financing inter-
mediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. LLY is a size measure and might fail to capture
the quality of services given by financial institutions. However, LLY may be also subject to
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double counting due to deposits of financial institutions into other financial intermediaries. The
BCOM variable is constructed on the assumption that commercial banks are more likely to
identify efficient investment opportunities by putting greater emphasis on risk management,
monitoring and mobilizing their savings than the central bank. Again, this measure of financial
development does not perfectly reflect the quality and quantity of services produced by finan-
cial intermediaries. Moreover, a commercial bank may also choose to loan only to governments.
PRIVO isolates the credit issued to the private sector from that issued to governments, govern-
ment agencies, and public enterprises. It excludes credits issued by central banks. As with
the other two indicators, PRIVO does not directly measure the quality and quantity of financial
services offered by financial intermediaries. However, LLB interpret higher levels of PRIVO as
indicative of financial intermediary development and they take it to be their preferred indicator.
CONDIT ION refers to a set of conditioning variables. That may include a simple or a
policy-augmented conditioning set, where the former includes the constant, the logarithm of
initial income per capita and average years of secondary schooling, while the latter includes in
addition to the simple set measures of government size, inflation, the black market exchange
rate premium, and openness to international trade. In the conditioning set, the initial income
is used to capture the convergence effect and school attainment is used to control for human
capital, whereas inflation rate and black market premium are proxies for economic stability and
price distortions.
The model given by equation (1), after conditioning on the initial period GDP, yi0, is nested
in the more general model (2) which will be introduced in following section by restricting
γ = 1. Even in a typical macro panel where the unit root is a common property, this assumption
can be quite restrictive. From an estimation point of view, even when the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable, yit−1, is not our primary concern, allowing for a dynamic process
can be crucial for the consistency of the other estimates. Moreover, the process governing the
real per capita income may, not surprisingly, be related to the previous period performance of
the economy. Therefore, in order to preserve the exogeneity of the FINANCE variables it is
important to investigate the process of economic growth in a dynamic framework. Finally, it is
important to acknowledge that the development of financial intermediaries itself takes time. In
case, where the switch between the pre- and post- financial development steady states does not
occur immediately, it is crucial to measure the short run effects on the economy by examining
the dynamic model of equation (2) below.
4 Estimating a Dynamic Growth Model
Consider the following equation for a country i at time t.
yit − yi,t−1 = (γ − 1)yi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + αi + uit for i = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ...,T (2)
where yit is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, X is a set of regressors, αi is an unobserved
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country-specific fixed effect and u is the disturbance term. The above model can be expressed
as
yit = γyi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + αi + uit (3)
Existence of the lagged dependent variable yit makes the classical Least Square Dummy
Variable, estimator inconsistent for fixed T, see Nickel (1981) and Judson and Owen (1999)
Among the various estimation techniques proposed to estimate the above model, the GMM
estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) have attracted most attention. Below we will briefly describe these estimators and we
will also introduce the EL approach that we use in this paper as the preferred alternative in
estimating these models.
4.1 The differenced GMM estimator
The standard GMM approach due to Arellano and Bond (1991) starts with first differencing
equation (2) in order to eliminate the fixed effects. The transformed model takes the following
form
∆yit = γ∆yi,t−1 + β′∆Xi,t + ∆uit (4)
where ∆ is the first difference operator.
Since the new error term ∆uit is by definition correlated with the lagged dependent variable
∆yi,t−1, one should use instrumental variables. The GMM approach uses all available lags of
the dependent and the exogenous variables to form an optimal instrumental variable matrix
Z = [Z1, ...,ZN]. The (T − 2) × (T − 1)(T − 2) matrix of instruments is constructed according to
the following moment conditions
E(yi,t− j,∆uit) = 0 for j = 1, ..., t (5)
E(xit,∆uit) = 0 for t = 1, ...,T (6)
which can be rewritten as
E(Zi∆uit) = 0 (7)
where
Zi =

yi1 xi1....xi3 0 0
0 yi1 yi2 xi1....xi4 0
0 0 yi1... yi,T−2 xi1....xiT
 (8)
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Since condition (6) requires strict exogeneity of the regressors xit , if xit are predetermined,
only lagged values can be employed as instruments. We define the sample moment conditions
as
gi(δ) =
1
N
N∑
i
ZTi ∆ui = 0 (9)
The efficient GMM estimator is the solution to
δ̂GMM = arg min(∆uTZWZT∆u) (10)
where the weighting matrix is defined as,
W = (
1
N
N∑
i
ZTi ∆ûi∆û
T
i Zi)
−1 (11)
and ∆ûi is obtained by a first step consistent estimation of (4).
Simulation studies showed that the GMM estimator that uses the optimal weighting matrix
can have poor small sample properties, see Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). The main problem arises when the observed sample provides only weak instruments,
see Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1998). This is the case when either the individual series are close
to being random walk or the fixed effects are more variable than the random disturbance, uit. A
typical macro data set can be prone to these problems, where the data are highly persistent and
as a result the lagged values of the variables are only weakly correlated with the differenced
regressors ∆yi,t−1 and ∆Xi,t. Furthermore, in empirical growth models, since 5-year averages are
used to smoothen out the cyclical patterns of the data, even when the observed sample spans
over long time periods, the actual time dimension is quite small something that contributes to
the estimation problems mentioned above.
4.2 System GMM
Arellano and Bover (1995) introduce a new estimator, the so called System GMM (SysGMM),
to deal with the shortcomings of the standard GMM estimator. The new estimator combines the
differenced model (4) and with the regression in levels. The differenced model is instrumented
using moment conditions (5 )and (6), whereas the level regression utilizes the following
E
[(
yi,t−s − yi,t−s−1) (αi + ui,t)] = 1 for s = 1 (12)
E
[(
Xi,t−s − Xi,t−s−1) (αi + ui,t)] = 1 for s = 1 (13)
A potential problem with SysGMM is that, the number of moments is often more than the
cross sectional dimension of a typical macro panel. In this case the estimator is subject to
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over-fitting bias and the standard errors are heavily distorted. In addition, SysGMM, as GMM,
weights the moment conditions equally over the sample, something that can negatively affect
the performance of these estimator in the presence of weak instruments.
4.3 Empirical Likelihood
EL offers itself as a natural alternative to GMM, when estimation relies on using conditional
moment restrictions. The main advantage of the technique is to assign probability weights to
the moment conditions in order to control their validity. This is particularly important in dy-
namic panel data models where the data is subject to persistence and hence weak instruments.
EL attains the semi-parametric efficiency bound and hence shares the same first order efficiency
with GMM. Additionally, Newey and Smith (2004) showed that EL offers additional advan-
tages related to better higher order asymptotics than GMM, since the EL estimator does not
share certain components of the second order bias that characterizes GMM estimators. The
asymptotic bias of GMM estimator is increasing with the number of over-identifying restric-
tions, which is not the case with EL.
The EL estimator, maximizes an empirical likelihood distribution subject to certain zero
valued moment conditions1. The maximization problem can be written as
max
pii
N−1
N∑
i=1
ln(pii)
sub ject to
∑
piigi(δ) = 0,∑
pii = 1,
and pii > 0
(14)
where δ = (γ β′) , gi(δ) is the set of the moment conditions and pii are the empirical prob-
abilities. The first restriction ties the data to the model parameters, the second one involves
the normalization constraint
∑
pii = 1 and finally the non-zero condition pii > 0 ensures that
the usual probability properties are observed. Unlike GMM, EL treats weights pii as additional
parameters to be estimated, whereas GMM estimators restrict them to be pii = 1/N. The La-
grangian for the above maximization problem is
L(pi, η, λ) ≡ N−1
N∑
i=1
ln(pii) − η
 N∑
i=1
pii − 1
 − λT N∑
i=1
piigi(δ) (15)
where η and λ are Lagrange multipliers. It can be shown that the solution to the above
problem yields η = 1 and
pi∗i (δ, λ) =
[
N
(
1 + λTgi(δ
)]−1
(16)
1As a rule, any instruments defined by GMM process can be used by EL estimation. Here
∑
piigi =∑
piiZi∆ui.
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From equation (16) it is readily seen that the probability weights decrease with an increasing
Lagrange multiplier, λ. This allows EL to put less weight on the sample moment conditions
when they depart further away from zero. Substituting pi∗i into the objective function yields the
empirical log-likelihood function
ln [LEL(δ)] = −N−1
N∑
i=1
ln
[(
1 + λˆ(δ)Tgi(δ
)]
(17)
where λˆ(δ) has to satisfy the following implicit function
λˆ(δ) = arg
N N∑
i=1
1 + λˆ(δ)T .gi(δˆEL)
−1 gi(δˆEL) = 0 (18)
Finally, the EL estimator, δˆEL, can be obtained as
δˆEL = arg max
δ
ln[LEL(δ)] (19)
The estimation of EL parameters δˆEL and λˆ(δ) using the implicit functions (18) and (19)
can be computationally cumbersome even when the panel dimension is moderate. A practical
remedy is, first to maximize the empirical log-likelihood function over the Lagrange multiplier
λ for a given consistent estimate for δ to obtain a profile empirical likelihood. Finally, the profile
empirical likelihood is maximized over δ to obtain the final estimate, δˆEL, see Kitamura (2001).
4.4 Test of Overidentifying Restrictions
In a dynamic panel data model, the number of instruments increases geometrically. It is com-
mon practice to drop the earliest lags of the instruments in order to facilitate the estimation and
omit redundant variables from the instrument matrix. The validity of this subset of restrictions
is examined by a test of Over Identifying Restrictions (OIR), where the null hypothesis is that
there is no correlation between the additional instruments and the differenced error terms.
The OIR test based on minimized GMM criterion is given by the J test
J(δˆG2) = g¯(δˆG2)W(δˆG1)g¯(δˆG2) (20)
where δˆG1and δˆG2 are the one and two step GMM estimators respectively and g¯(.) is the
sample averages of the moment conditions mentioned earlier. When the moment conditions are
valid, the test statistics NJ(δˆ2) has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with m − k degrees
of freedom where m denotes the number of over-identifying restrictions and k is the number
of model parameters. The OIR test is found to over reject the correct null hypothesis severely
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compared to its nominal size. This problem arises due to severe downward bias in the estimated
asymptotic standard errors of the GMM estimator, see Arellano Bond (1991).
A very informative by-product of Empirical Likelihood estimation allows us to construct
an OIR test statistics which is the first order equivalent to the J test presented above. This
likelihood ratio type test is twice the difference between unrestricted empirical likelihood ,
−n log(n), and the maximized empirical likelihood of the model given in equation (15). Hence,
the test statistic is
OIREL = LRn =
∑
2 ln(1 + λˆ
′
g(δˆEL)) (21)
Recent simulation studies, see Imbens et al (1998), showed that the OIREL test based on
Empirical Likelihood have better small sample performance that the GMM based Jtest .
5 Monte Carlo Evidence
Below we will present a small Monte Carlo simulation study that compares the bias and root
mean square error (RMSE) performance of GMM and EL using artificial data sets that mimic
the characteristics of the growth data that we use. The DGP design follows Kiviet (1995) and
can be summarized as follows.
The dependent variable is generated according to
yit = αi + γyit−1 + xTitβ + uit, uit ∼ N(0, σ2u) (22)
where the xit are formed by the following AR(1) process
xit = ρxit−1 + ζit, ζit ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ). (23)
Kiviet (1995) defines a signal to noise ratio σ2s and shows that it can be calculated from the
other parameters as follows
σ2s = β
2σ2ζ
[
1 +
(γ + ρ)2
1 + γρ
[γρ − 1] − (γρ)2
]−1
+
γ2
1 − γ2σ
2
u
The signal to noise ratio controls the information supplied by xit in order to explain yit. The
higher σ2s , the more useful the xit becomes to the model.
Additionally the vector of fixed effects α is drawn from N(0, σα). The standard deviation of
the fixed effects σα is determined by
σα = µσu(1 − γ)
The parameter µ is used to control relative variance of fixed effect with respect to the residual
variance σ2u. When µ is equal to 1, the impact of both shocks are the same.
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In order to mimic the macro growth data at our disposal and to form an environment where
the data is highly persistent and therefore the instruments are only weakly defined, we choose
the simulation parameters as follows. The data for yit and xit are generated to be close to random
walk (γ = 0.8 and ρ = 0.9 or 0.5), σ2s alternates between 2 and 8 and µ takes the values 1 and
5. The time dimension of the panel is allowed to alternate between 5 and 7, while the cross
sectional dimension fixed at 200. Also xi0 and yi0 are set to zero and the first 50 observations
are discarded before choosing the appropriate sample. Finally, 500 replications are conducted
for the simulations.
The results are discussed by computing the bias and the RMSE of the different estimators.
Tables 1 and 2 report the bias and RMSE of one- and two-step GMM estimators alongside the
performance of the EL estimator.
The one-step GMM estimator (hereafter GMM1), is obtained by setting the weighting matrix
in (10) to W = ( 1N
∑N
i Z
T
i HZi)
−1, where H is a T − 2 square matrix which has twos on the main
diagonal, minus ones on the first sub-diagonals and zeros otherwise. Here, H is used to deal with
the MA(1) error term of the first-differenced model (4). The efficient GMM estimator, GMM2,
is computed by using GMM1 as an initial first step consistent estimator in the definition of W
in equation (11).
We can see that when the data is generated to mimic a macro panel with high persistency
problems EL outperforms GMM in all cases in terms of absolute bias and in about ninety per-
cent of cases in terms of MSE. The performance differences are most visible when we generate
highly persistent data, by limiting the information supplied by xit, by setting σ2s = 2 and letting
the variance of the fixed effects to be larger than the error variance by choosing µ = 0.5
6 Results from Macro Panel
In this section we present the results from the dynamic growth model presented above in section
4, based on the formulation of equation (3)2. Tables 3 to 8 present the coefficient estimates of
the different FINANCE variables, LLY, BCOM and PRIVO, alongside their p-values for sig-
nificance and the OIR test statistics. For each financial development measure (LLY, BCOM and
PRIVO) the regressions including simple and policy conditioning sets are carried out separately.
The regressions are repeated including time dummies. Note that time dummies, apart from their
usual role of capturing deterministic trends in the data, serve as exogenous instruments when
they are included into the model. For GMM we report both the efficient GMM2 and the System
GMM (SysGMM) estimates.
Table 3 reports the results for Liquid Liabilities (LLY) using the simple conditioning set.
The short run effect of an exogenous change in LLY on growth is statistically significant and
2LLB used the formulation given in equation (2), whereas we use equation (3) as the basis of our estima-
tion. The results from formulation (2) are qualitatively similar to those obtained using (3), except that in
certain cases convergence was more difficult to achieve both for SysGMM and EL.
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economically large. EL estimates of Liquid Liabilities (LLY) are highly significant and positive.
GMM estimation underestimates this effect and rejects the validity of instruments, when time
dummies are not included and for GMM2 also in the case when time dummies are included.
The OIR test based on the EL procedure does not reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation
between the instruments and the errors of the model in either case. The parameter estimates
form GMM2 suggest a negative relationship between human capital and growth, whereas the
opposite is true for EL and also for SysGMM when time dummies are included. The LLY
estimate is only significant for GMM2 if time dummies are excluded.
Table 4 presents the results when the policy conditioning set is included. Again we dis-
tinguish between the cases where time dummies are included or not. Both GMM and EL co-
efficients are significant for LLY and both the OIREL and J tests confirm the validity of the
instruments for the case when time dummies are included. However, for EL, when time dum-
mies are not included the OIREL test suggests that there is misspecification in the choice of
instruments. Inclusion of time dummies changes dramatically the results for EL estimation,
where the LLY coefficient increases substantially. Note that the effect of human capital is again
negative for both sets of GMM estimates when no time dummies are present and it becomes
positive for SysGMM when time dummies are included. It is positive for EL. Even though, the
J-test suggests that there is no instrument misspecification in either case, the GMM parameter
estimates differ, with some variables changing signs and significance levels. Including time
dummies as part of the model seems to be improving the results from a specification point of
view for EL as it is evident from the OIREL p-values. On the other hand, even though there
is no sign of misspecification according to the J-test, the variability of results between the two
cases suggests a lack of robustness and hence the presence of misspecification not captured by
the J-test for both sets of GMM2 and SysGMM estimates.
The effect of Private Credit variable (PRIVO) is presented in Table 5 when we only allow
for a simple conditioning set, with and without the time dummies. Inclusion of time dummies
seems to produce plausible estimated relationships for both EL and GMM2. In that case, the
latter produces larger estimates for the role of private credit on economic growth than either
SysGMM or EL. However, SysGMM produces a negative effect of human capital, something
that differs both from EL and GMM2. The estimates of human capital are both positive for
both EL and GMM2, in contrast to the results from LLY when only EL produced positive
estimates. The results for PRIVO improve when policy conditioning variables are included into
the regression as seen in Table 6. The OIREL test suggests that the relationship is misspecified,
when time dummies are excluded. The J-test statistics for both sets of GMM estimates on
the other hand do not display any signs of misspecification, yet for the two cases both sets
of the GMM coefficient estimates jump around in terms of sign and significance and are not
robust. Note for example, that the SysGMM estimate of the effect of human capital on growth
is negative and significant when no time dummies are present and turns positive when the latter
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are present with a p-value of 0.07. The OIREL test suggests that the formulation with the time
dummies is well specified and the results obtained in that case seem quite reasonable. The J-test
is unable to distinguish between the two cases of not including and including the time dummies,
yet the GMM estimates are themselves not robust between the two cases. Therefore, when the
moment restrictions are appropriately weighted as it the case with EL, the PRIVO results with
the policy conditioning set can be viewed with confidence, whereas the same is not true for the
standard GMM methods.
Table 7 presents the results for BCOM with the simple conditioning. Both the OIREL and the
J-test suggest that the time dummies should be included. In that case, the EL and GMM2 results
suggest that the BCOM does not have a significant effect on growth, whereas the SysGMM
estimates produce a significant and positive effect. Table 8 presents the results when we use
the policy conditioning set, with and without the time dummies. EL is correctly specified when
time dummies are included and in that case the results show that BCOM has a large positive
effect on economic growth and this effect is highly statistically significant. On the other hand
GMM estimation does not show any misspecification according to the J-test, yet the parameter
estimates are clearly not robust between the two cases for both sets of estimates. In fact for
GMM2, the coefficient on BCOM becomes negative and insignificant when time dummies are
included, whereas the SysGMM estimates for human capital changes sign between the two
cases.
In general the picture that emerges from EL estimation suggests that results based on con-
ditioning sets augmented with time dummies are on the whole reliable estimates of the effects
of the financial intermediaries variables on growth. On the other hand, the results from GMM
for either GMM2 or SysGMM seem quite unreliable, jumping around between different models
which according to the J-test are supposed to be well specified. Using EL we have found a
positive effect on growth for all three variables. However the LLY is nearly twice as much as
BCOM and four times as large as PRIVO. Our results do not produce the same sizeable effects
that were obtained in LLB, although we do obtain statistically significant estimates using EL in
well specified formulations. When interpreting the effect of financial intermediaries on growth,
one has to be careful to identify a correctly specified model that produces these results and from
what we have seen in our estimates, there is a lot of variation between different specifications
depending on the conditioning and instrument sets. Overall, EL provides a useful method to
overcome the problems that plague GMM in dynamic panel models and offers a robust method
to distinguish between the different measures of financial intermediaries with regard to their
effect on growth.
7 Conclusions
The current paper analyses the effect of exogenous financial intermediary development on eco-
nomic growth using a dynamic panel data model. Dynamic panel data model estimation is
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often conducted using the GMM procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991), where the lags of
the regressors are used as instruments. The main problem with this method is that the GMM
estimation weights moment conditions equally over the sample. However, if a part of the data
is associated with only weak instruments, GMM estimators are subject to considerable small
sample bias. Moreover, test statistics based on GMM estimation can be heavily distorted due to
the downward bias of asymptotic standard errors. In this paper we employ EL estimation as an
alternative to GMM to cope with these problems. Using EL in the context of a dynamic panel
model allows us to obtain more robust estimates of the relationship between financial interme-
diation and economic growth than those obtained in the recent empirical literature based on
conventional GMM. The latter display a lot of variability between different model formulations
based on different conditioning and instrument sets. Using GMM makes these formulations
appear equally well specified according to tests for over-identifying restrictions. This is not the
case for EL, where we are able to distinguish between well-specified and misspecified model
specifications.
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Table 1: Average Absolute Bias , GMM and EL Estimators
ρ=0.5 ρ=0.9
GMM1 GMM2 EL T µ sigma2s GMM1 GMM2 EL T µ σ
2
s
0.1182 0.1191 0.0591 5 1 2 0.1309 0.1333 0.0741 5 1 2
0.0286 0.0272 0.0069 5 1 8 0.0927 0.0955 0.0582 5 1 8
0.3196 0.344 0.125 5 5 2 0.365 0.3975 0.1871 5 5 2
0.0911 0.1001 0.0299 5 5 8 0.2093 0.2256 0.1047 5 5 8
0.0332 0.0384 0.0237 7 1 2 0.0407 0.0543 0.0074 7 1 2
0.0226 0.0175 0.0056 7 1 8 0.0303 0.0375 0.0021 7 1 8
0.1257 0.1542 0.0216 7 5 2 0.1668 0.1882 0.0328 7 5 2
0.0418 0.0363 0.0001 7 5 8 0.1 0.1216 0.0304 7 5 8
Table 2: RMSE , GMM and EL Estimators
ρ=0.5 ρ=0.9
GMM1 GMM2 EL T µ σ2s GMM1 GMM2 EL T µ σ
2
s
0.1563 0.1672 0.1256 5 1 2 0.1692 0.1773 0.1339 5 1 2
0.0733 0.0834 0.0771 5 1 8 0.1286 0.1295 0.1054 5 1 8
0.3887 0.4321 0.3185 5 5 2 0.4322 0.4757 0.3975 5 5 2
0.1307 0.1572 0.1454 5 5 8 0.2554 0.275 0.174 5 5 8
0.0599 0.0591 0.0585 7 1 2 0.0715 0.0739 0.0548 7 1 2
0.0446 0.0403 0.0372 7 1 8 0.0561 0.0564 0.0466 7 1 8
0.152 0.1875 0.1597 7 5 2 0.1955 0.2128 0.1409 7 5 2
0.0726 0.0764 0.0968 7 5 8 0.1256 0.1554 0.087 7 5 8
Table 3: Liquid Liabilities with Simple Conditioning Set
Time Dummies Not Included Included
GMM2 SysGMM EL GMM2 SysGMM EL
GDPt−1 0.68801 1.062541 0.61893 0.81225 0.995582 0.89921
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Secondary Education -0.0206 -0.309211 0.08399 -0.1284 0.019553 0.55386
(0.8248) (0.0000) (0.4187) (0.3797) (0.8715) (0.4187)
Liquid Liabilities 0.30426 0.129994 0.64917 0.09043 0.096132 0.47142
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0) (0.2612) (0.0034) (0.0000)
OIR 0 0.04 0.1592 0.004 0.27 0.0751
Note: The OIR results refer to the p-values of the J − test under the GMM columns and of the
OIREL under the EL column.
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Table 4: Liquid Liabilities with Policy Conditioning Set
Time Dummies Not Included Included
GMM2 SysGMM EL GMM2 SysGMM EL
GDPt−1 0.61887 1.040505 0.33165 0.89172 0.953817 0.81728
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Secondary Education -0.0229 -0.243359 0.17498 -0.0788 0.058803 0.3712
(0.7371) (0.0017) (0.0433) (0.5285) (0.3707) (0.1116)
Liquid Liabilities 0.29594 0.155837 0.53144 0.21056 0.210444 0.909
(0.0000) -(0.0072) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Government Size 0.02298 -0.049967 -0.121 0.02607 -0.03506 0.05023
0.73459 0.4169 0.26573 0.63233 -0.4836 0.70332
Opennes to Trade 0.03494 -0.062524 0.25197 -0.019 -0.03323 0.0737
(0.3824) (0.1419) (0.0007) (0.6068) (0.3691) (0.5285)
Inflation 0.21643 0.03026 0.69812 0.05839 0.146357 0.10432
(0.0112) (0.7552) (0.0000) (0.4697) (0.0539) (0.5483)
Black Market Premium -0.0479 -0.153461 0.129 0.00854 -0.04157 0.145
(0.0776) (0.0023) (0.0097) (0.7537) (0.1289) (0.0513)
OIR 0.125 0.426 0.0034 0.129 0.962 0.6014
Note: The OIR results refer to the p-values of the J − test under the GMM columns and of the
OIREL under the EL column.
Table 5: Private Credits with Simple Conditioning Set
Time Dummies Not Included Included
GMM2 SysGMM EL GMM2 SysGMM EL
GDPt−1 0.6211 1.0713 0.5735 0.6648 1.0046 0.8398
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Secondary Education 0.0932 -0.4042 0.4005 0.2401 -0.0081 0.0372
(0.2039) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0740) (0.9398) (0.8013)
Private Credits 0.1412 0.0971 0.0638 0.2069 0.1019 0.1141
0.0000 (0.0008) (0.0792) (0.0001) (0.0061) (0.0363)
OIR 0.0160 0.0280 0.0000 0.3130 0.3720 0.2060
Note: The OIR results refer to the p-values of the J − test under the GMM columns and of the
OIREL under the EL column.
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Table 6: Private Credits with Policy Conditioning Set
Time Dummies Not Included Included
GMM2 SysGMM EL GMM2 SysGMM EL
GDPt−1 0.5633 1.0076 0.6664 0.8122 0.9522 0.8653
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Secondary Education 0.0942 -0.1043 0.2206 0.2746 0.1235 0.2049
(0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0005) (0.0062) (0.0706) (0.0658)
Liquid Liabilities 0.1533 0.0711 0.2157 0.1464 0.1131 0.1210
(0.0000) (0.0130) (0.0000) (0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Government Size 0.0574 -0.0948 -0.0835 -0.0730 -0.0681 -0.0310
(0.2212) (0.0917) (0.1870) (0.1547) (0.2594) (0.7440)
Opennes to Trade 0.0305 -0.1189 -0.1435 -0.0842 -0.0060 -0.1847
(0.3223) (0.0054) (0.0041) (0.0232) (0.8615) (0.0356)
Inflation 0.0738 -0.1979 0.1786 -0.0002 0.0136 -0.1057
(0.3103) (0.0110) (0.1050) (0.9991) (0.8610) (0.4729)
Black Market Premium -0.0051 -0.1451 0.1680 0.0230 -0.0406 0.0290
(0.8373) (0.0025) (0.0041) (0.6406) (0.2652) (0.7175)
OIR 0.1420 0.4610 0.0000 0.7020 0.7510 0.2000
Note: The OIR results refer to the p-values of the J − test under the GMM columns and of the
OIREL under the EL column.
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